REFLECTIONS ON THE VMI DECISION
DEBORAH L. BRAKE"
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Virginid is a
landmark victory for the women's legal movement in a number of
respects. In addition to requiring the Virginia Military Institute
(NVMI") to open its doors to women and rejecting the use of genderbased stereotypes about women as a group to limit women's opportunities as individuals, the Court applied what may prove to be its
strongest legal test yet for sex-based discrimination.2 Although some
commentators read the decision as a rebuff to the United States
government's request that the Court adopt strict scrutiny for gender,
the decision in fact strikes a careful balance in crafting a standard
with the teeth, if not the name, of strict scrutiny.' At the same time,
the Court's analysis leaves room to justify affirmative action programs
that use sex-based classifications designed to remedy, rather than
perpetuate, gender stereotypes that limit women's opportunities.
In briefs and oral argument presented to the Court, the United
States asked the Court to recognize sex as a suspect class and apply
strict scrutiny to sex-based discrimination, even though the adoption
of strict scrutiny was not necessary for the United States to win the
case." The amicus curiae brief filed by the National Women's Law
Center, ("The Center") and joined by twenty-seven civil rights and
women's groups, detailed the case for strict scrutiny and explained
why the Court should reach the issue even though a proper application of intermediate scrutiny would yield the same result.' The
Center's brief focused on the inability of many lower courts to propSenior Counsel, National Women's Law Center.
1. 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) (holding that the Constitution's equal protection guarantee
precludes Virginia from having a unique all-male institution).
2. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2276.
3. IR
4. Petitioner's Oral Argument, United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996), availableat
1996 WL 16020, *14-15; Brief for United States at 33, United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264
(1996) (Nos. 94-1941, 94-2107), availablein 1995 WL 681099, at *14-15.
5. See Brief for National Women's Law Center, et al., United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct.
2264 (1996) (Nos. 94-1941,94-2107), availablein 1995 WL 703392.
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erly apply the intermediate scrutiny standard, as exemplified by the
Fourth Circuit's decisions in the challenges to the exclusion of
women from VMI and the Citadel, among other cases.6
The Center's brief also discussed a number of anomalies created
by the Court's recent application of strict scrutiny to race-based
affirmative action programs, including the fact that, without strict
scrutiny for sex discrimination against women, white men would
receive greater legal protection in challenges to affirmative action
programs designed to remedy race discrimination than women
would have against straightforward sex discrimination.7 In addition,
because race and gender are often lumped together in local affirmative action programs and evaluated by legislators under the same
legal standard, in practice, affirmative action for blacks would be
subjected to the highest level of Constitutional scrutiny, while government discrimination against women would receive only
intermediate scrutiny.
While the Court stopped short of explicitly adopting strict scrutiny
for sex-based classifications, the opinion includes a number of indicators suggesting that the standard applied in VMT is essentially as
rigorous as today's strict scrutiny standard! Indeed, the analysis the
Court applied to strike down VMI's exclusion of women is all but
indistinguishable from strict scrutiny.
In rejecting the use of stereotypes to justify the separate women's
Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership ("VWIL") program and
the exclusion of women from VMI, the Court focused on the denial
of opportunity to the individual women who did not fit Virginia's sexbased generalizations.9 In evaluating the fit between the exclusion of
women from VMI and the state's interest in using the adversative
method at VMI, the Court found that the fit was not sufficiently
close." The Court rested this conclusion on the district court's findings that "some women" may prefer VMI's methodology to that of
VWIL and have the ability to meet all of VMI's requirements."
By requiring VMI to admit a woman if she has the interest and ability to succeed at VMI, the decision comes very close to applying the
6. See United States. v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), aftd, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir.
1995).
7. Brief for National Women's Law Center, United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996)
(Nos. 94-1941,94-2107), availablein 1995 WL 703392.
8. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2271-73.
9. Id. at 2283-84.
10. Id.
11. MIat2279.
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narrowly tailored strict scrutiny standard, requiring a perfect fit
between the classification and the state's interest. Justice Scalia
seized on the closeness of the fit required to attack the majority for
adopting strict scrutiny sub silentio 2 Justice Rehnquist's concurring
opinion also viewed the majority as essentially applying strict scrutiny
standard based on its requirement of an "exceedingly persuasive
justification" for gender-based classifications. The concurring and
dissenting opinions thus provide a gift to women's rights advocates
seeking to have courts apply strict scrutiny to sex-based discrimination. 4 Moreover, the majority opinion does not respond to the
assertions by Justices Rehnquist and Scalia that the standard applied
is higher than the intermediate scrutiny test applied by the Court in
the past. Although the Court's silence in the face of these accusations is not dispositive, it provides further support for the increasing
proximity between the standard applicable to sex discrimination and
strict scrutiny.
The heavy burden the opinion places on states seeking to uphold
sex-based classifications is further weighted by the Court's admonition that "[t]he burden of justification is demanding and it rests
entirely on the State."'" In spite of language in Mississippi University
for Women v. Hogan ("Hogan")6 stating that persons seeking to uphold
sex-based classifications "must carry the burden of showing an 'exceedingly persuasive justification,"'1 7 some post-Hogan courts have
placed the burden of proof on the challenger to prove that the classification is unrelated to an important state interest. The Court's
statement to the contrary should end such confusion by unequivocally placing the burden on the state to show that the sex-based
generalizations on which it relies are not overbroad.
It is also significant, in determining the degree of scrutiny applied
by the Court, that the majority did not need to go as far as it did in
articulating a standard that requires such a close fit between means

12. Id.at 2294 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
13. 116 S. Ct. at 2288 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
14. Id.at2287,2291.
15. Id at 2275.
16. 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (holding that an all women's institution violated the Equal Protection Clause).
17. Id. at 724.
18. Se, ag., Hines v. Caston Sch. Corp., 651 N.E.2d 330, 335 (Ind.Ct. App. 1995) (holding
that the policy did not violate due process or equal protection); Olesen v. Board of Educ. of Sch.
Dist. No. 228, 676 F. Supp. 820, 822 (N.D. IMI.1987) (holding that the rule did not violate equal
protection).
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and ends in order to decide the case. 9 The Court could have found
the exclusion of women unconstitutional simply by recognizing, as it
did, that the state's interest in educational diversity was not the genuine purpose behind VMI's exclusion of women, and moreover, that
such an interest would not be substantially served by denying a
unique educational opportunity to women." In addition, because
the other interest asserted by VMI, preserving the adversative
method, did not rise to the level of an important state interest, the
Court could have required VMI to admit women without discussing
in greater detail the required fit between the sex-based classification
and the asserted governmental interest.
While the genesis of the Court's discussion of the fit between sexbased classifications and the state interest has strong roots in the
Court's past cases, including fE.B. v. Alabama,1 Hogan,'" and Reed v.
Reed,' all of which rejected overbroad generalizations about women's
abilities, the VMI Court takes this analysis a step further. The majority's discussion suggests that if an individual woman does not
conform to the sex-based generalization on which the state has relied, the generalization is overbroad and therefore invalid. The
"substantially related" piece of the intermediate scrutiny test is
thereby tightened and now appears closer to the "necessary" fit required under strict scrutiny.
The opinion also inched closer to strict scrutiny in its requirement
that classifications based on sex be supported by an "exceedingly
persuasive justification."" Although this language first surfaced in
the 1979 decision, Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney,'

19. Vrginia, 116S. Ct. at 2283-85.
20. Such a ruling would have been fully supported by Hogan. As the Hogan court recognized, the main issue is whether the state's use of discrimination is substantially related to
achieving a legitimate goal rather than whether the benefited class profits from the classification:
The issue is not whether the befiefited class profits from the classification, but whether
the State's decision to confer a benefit only upon one class by means of a discriminatory classification is substantially related to achieving a legitimate and substantial goal.
Hogan, 458 U.S. at 731 n.17. While Vuginia's decision to offer VM to men only may provide
educational diversity to men, as the Court found, it does not justify the denial of such a unique

opportunity to women.
21. J.E.B., 511 US. 127 (1994) (holding that peremptory strikes based on gender violated the
Equal Protection Clause).
22. 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (holding that MUW's policy of denying males the right to enroll for
credit in its nursing school violated the Equal Protection Clause).
23. 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (holding that section 15-312 of Idaho Laws violated the Equal Protec-

tion Clause).
24. 1&at 2267.
25. 442 US. 256,273 (1979).
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and again in Hogan,6 it had previously been used only to describe the
difficulty of demonstrating that the challenged sex-based classification bore a substantial relationship to an important state interestY
In the VMT opinion, however, the majority used the "exceedingly
persuasive justification" requiremente as a substantive standard in its
own right, that appears to be somewhat more stringent than the
substantial relationship-important state interest test. The Court
referred to the test as "[t]oday's skeptical scrutiny " ' and emphasized
that the state must show "at least that the [challenged] classification
serves 'important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed' are 'substantially related to the achievement of
those objectives,' ' " suggesting that the burden may in fact be higher.
In explaining the basis for "[t]oday's skeptical scrutiny," the Court
referred to the "long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination""
recognized in Frontierov. Richardson,2 in which four Justices adopted
strict scrutiny for sex-based classifications." After Frontiero,without a
fifth vote for strict scrutiny, the Court retreated from a strict scrutiny
standard for gender in Craigv. Boren," and fashioned the intermediate scrutiny test. Since Craig, the Court has consistently applied
intermediate scrutiny to gender discrimination, although it has
explicitly reserved the applicability of strict scrutiny to gender as an
open question."
The VMT Court took a further step in closing the gap between intermediate and strict scrutiny by acknowledging similarities in the
Court's analysis of racial and sex-based classifications, stating: 'Without equating gender classifications, for all purposes, to classifications
based on race or national origin, the Court, in post-Reed decisions,
has carefully inspected official action that closes a door or denies
opportunity to women (or to men)."" The Court's implication is
26. 458 U.S. at 718.
27. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 256.
28. Vginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2274.
29. Id. at 2274-75.
30. Id. at 2275 (emphasis added) (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 US. 142,
150 (1980)).
31. Vtrginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2274-75.
32. 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (holding that sex-based discrimination must be subject to strict
scrutiny and that the statutes violate the due process clause).
33. Rd
34. 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976) (emphasizing that to withstand constitutional challenge,
classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially
related to achievement of those objectives).
35. SeeJ.E.B., 511 US. at 13444; Hogan, 458 US. at 724 n.9.
36. Wrginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2275 (emphasis added).
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that, at least in some contexts, race and gender classifications will
warrant the same legal treatment.
The Court further embellished this suggestion by noting that it has
"thus far reserved most stringent judicial scrutiny for classifications
based on race or national origin, but last Term observed that strict
scrutiny of such classifications is not inevitably 'fatal in fact.""' 7 One
plausible reading of this statement is that "thus far" means until
today, in this very decision. At a minimum, the Court refused to
foreclose the explicit adoption of strict scrutiny to gender-based
classifications in the future."
The strength of the test fashioned by the VMJ Court makes it even
more difficult for sex-based classifications that discriminate against
women to survive constitutional scrutiny-a possible development for
women's rights litigators. 9 On the other hand, if in fact the Court's
decision does raise the level of scrutiny applicable to sex-based discrimination, opponents of affirmative action will argue that sex-based
classifications designed to compensate for past discrimination will be
subjected to a higher standard of review as well. The Court's opinion, however, goes a long way toward ensuring that the standard
crafted still leaves room for sex-based classifications designed to
remedy sex discrimination.'
In noting that the Court has "thus far" reserved strict scrutiny for
race and national origin, the majority reiterated its observation last
term in Adarand that strict scrutiny "is not inevitably 'fatal in fact."'4'
In this statement, the Court not only edges the standards for race and
gender closer together by acknowledging that strict scrutiny is not, as
it once was thought to be, necessarily fatal, but also supports the
continuing viability of affirmative action.'
In addition to suggesting that the application of strict scrutiny to
gender would not be fatal in fact, the Court carefully distinguished
sex-based classifications designed to remedy discrimination from sexbased discrimination against women.' The Court acknowledged that
sex is not a "proscribed classification," because sex classifications,
while not permitted to limit individual opportunity, "may be used to
37. Id. at n.6 (citingAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995)).
38. Id. at 2276.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 2287.
41. Viiginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2275 n.6 (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,
237 (1995)).
42. Id.
43 Id. at 2276.
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compensate women 'for particular economic disabilities [they have]
suffered,' to 'promot[e] equal employment opportunity,' to advance
full development of the talent and capacities of our Nation's peoThis language approving the affirmative use of sex
ple.""
classifications to compensate for past discrimination is perhaps the
broadest the Court has used in recent years to describe valid affirmative action programs."
The Court's approval of carefully designed affirmative action programs has particular significance for the future of educational
programs targeting girls and women in order to compensate for the
particular barriers they face.' The Court suggests that single-gender
programming that is tailored to overcome sex-based obstacles stands
on a different footing from all-male programming that does not serve
such a compensatory purpose.47 In one footnote, the Court approvingly cites an amicus curiae brief filed by twenty-six private women's
colleges, describing the purpose of women's colleges as "to dissipate,
rather than perpetuate, traditional gender classifications."' At another point, in the context of acknowledging the potential benefits of
single-gender education, the Court cites a discussion by social scientists that invokes a similar rationale to distinguish all-male from allfemale education:
The pluralistic argument for preserving all-male colleges is
uncomfortably similar to the pluralistic argument for preserving all-white colleges ....The all-male college would be
relatively easy to defend if it emerged from a world in which
women were established as fully equal to men. But it does
not. It is therefore likely to be a witting or unwitting device
for preserving tacit assumptions of male superiority-assumptions for which women must eventually pay."
This footnote, coupled with the Court's analysis of the denial to
women of the benefits of VMI, casts a shadow of doubt on the validity
of all-male public education, while leaving room to distinguish allfemale public education under an affirmative action rationale. Although the Court purports to address only the exclusion of women
44. Id.
45. See Califano v. Webster, 430 US. 313, 320 (1977) (holding that the Social Security Act
provision is not unconstitutional); California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 289
(1987) (holding that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act is constitutional).
46. 116 S. Ct. at 2277.
47. Id. at 2276-77.
48. Id. at 2276 n.7 (citing Hogan, 458 US. 718, 720 n.1 (1982)).
49. Id. at 2277 n.8 (quoting CHRiStOPHER JENCKS & DAVID RMEsMAN, THE AcADENnc
REVOLUTION 297-298 (1968)).
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from a single-gender educational program that is "unique,"' the
Court's detailed analysis of those factors which make a program
unique, including a myriad of intangible factors, will make virtually
all education programs "unique" because these factors will rarely, if
ever, be identical."
All-female education programs, however, even if regarded as
"unique" under the Court's analysis, may nevertheless be justified if
they are narrowly tailored to serve the state's interest in remedying
the persistent sex-based barriers that limit women's opportunities. As
more states and localities experiment with single-gender programming for girls, 2 particularly in fields such as math and science where
women have been historically underrepresented, the validity of such
programs will depend on their ability to demonstrate that they truly
serve a compensatory purpose, rather than simply reflect stereotyped
notions about male and female roles and abilities. While such programs will be carefully scrutinized in the future, the Court's analysis
leaves open the possibility that single-gender programming for a
gender that has faced disproportionate barriers will survive constitutional scrutiny.
The implications of the Court's decision extend far beyond allmale military colleges. The VM! ruling sends a clear message to
public institutions that traditional stereotypes about women's abilities
may not be used to limit an individual woman's access to opportunity. In addition, the level of scrutiny applied to gender-based
classifications which discriminate against women has become indistinguishable from the strict scrutiny applied to race and national
origin discrimination. The Court's clarification of the standard of
scrutiny for gender, and its application to affirmative programs designed to overcome gender-based barriers, may prove to be the most
enduring part of the VM!decision and have significant implications
for future sex-based discrimination cases.

50. Id.at 2276.
51. Id.

52. See Jacques Steinberg, AM-Girls PublicSchool to Open Despite Objections, N.Y. TIs,Aug. 14,
1996, atBi.

